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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of the disinﬂation policy timing on
the sign and the magnitude of the sacriﬁce ratio in a modiﬁed price and
wage staggered model of Blanchard (1986). When wages are updated
every four quarters and prices every two quarters, we show that a
“cold-turkey” disinﬂation is associated to an output boom when the
policy is implemented during the last period of life of the wage contract
and a recession the other quarters.
Keywords: Disinﬂation policy; Shock timing; Sacriﬁce ratio; Price
and wage staggered contracts.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31; E52
1 Introduction
There is a huge literature on the conduct of monetary policy in a framework
with optimizing agents facing constraints when they want to adjust their
price or wage decisions. Due to these nominal rigidities, monetary shocks
have persistent real eﬀects. While some divergences remain concerning the
quantitative impact of monetary shocks in such models, a common feature of
this literature is to consider that the impact of shocks on economic variables
is independent from the date of their occurrence during the calendar year.
This paper shows that the timing of a disinﬂation policy may have a im-
pact on the size of the sacriﬁce ratio, and, more importantly, on the sign of
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1the output response. We determine the conditions under which an immediate
a n du n e x p e c t e dd i s i n ﬂation (often called “cold-turkey” disinﬂation) is asso-
ciated to an output boom. Some papers already associate output booms to
disinﬂations. However, it is always in the case of gradual or pre-announced
disinﬂations, as in the sticky price models of Ball (1994a)o rM a n k i wa n d
Reis (2002). In these models, the origin of the disinﬂationary boom is not
due to a speciﬁc assumption about the kind of nominal rigidities. It comes
from the combination of sticky prices with the assumption of an expected
disinﬂation. Taking into account this future disinﬂation, sticky price setters
begin to lower their prices immediately, leading to a rise of real balances and
an output boom. However a cold-turkey disinﬂation in these models is at
best associated with a real neutrality.
We derive our result from the ‘wage-price’ spiral model of Blanchard
(1986). It is based on staggered prices and wages contracts àl aTaylor in a
monopolistic competition setup. Our main assumption concerns the distinct
duration of the price and wage contracts. We assume that prices are adjusted
every two quarters while wages are set annually. This assumption has strong
implications concerning the real impact of an unexpected disinﬂation. We
s h o wt h a tt h eo u t p u tb o o mo n l yo c c u r sw h e nt h ed i s i n ﬂation begins in the
last period of the wage contract. If the same policy is implemented in other
periods, it implies recessions of various sizes. Our approach shares some
common features with Olivei and Teneyro (2007, 2008). They show that the
date of a monetary shock may have a diﬀe r e n ti m p a c to no u t p u td e v i a t i o n
depending on the percentage of wages which are changed during the quarter
o ft h ec a l e n d a ry e a r . B u to u rw o r kd i ﬀers since we do not consider a non
uniform distribution of staggering contracts àl aCalvo (1983).
The timing structure of our model is mainly guided by empirical consid-
erations. As Ball (1994b) points out, “in many countries, virtually all wages
are set for one year with no time-variation”, and it concerns “more than 80
percent of US wages”. Taylor (1999) and Dickens et al. (2006) also note
that most of the wages are negotiated annually. Furthermore, Olivei and
Tenreyro (2007,2008) support the idea that annual wage changes are mostly
concentrated in the same quarter of the year in the United States (U.S.)
and Japan (but not for major countries of the Euro area). Evidence for a
faster adjustment of prices is also well documented. Among others, Bils and
Klenow (2004) ﬁnd that half of goods’ prices last 5.5 months or less in the
U.S.1. Based on these empirical ﬁndings, we can plausibly assume that prices
1Altissimo et al. (2006) highlight that the degree of price rigidity seems to be higher
for the Euro area (around one year).
2are more often adjusted than wages, leading to a higher duration for wage
contracts than price contracts. Moreover this assumption is in line with the
“old” Keynesian feature that wages are more sticky than most prices in the
U.S. (Friedman, 1999).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces asymmetric
price and wage contracts, and determines analytically the impact of monetary
shocks on the dynamics of prices and wages. Section 3 shows that a “cold-
turkey” disinﬂation can have a diﬀerent impact depending on the date of the
shock. Finally, Section 4 presents a brief summary and conclusion.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider the reduced form of Blanchard (1986) derived from the general
equilibrium imperfect competition model of Blanchard and Kiyotaky (1987).
Let p, w, m and y be the price level, the nominal wage, the stock of money
and the output, respectively.2 Let p∗ and w∗ be the price and wage that
maximize the proﬁt for a given period. The elasticities a and b,w i t h0 <
a,b < 1, respectively measure the degree of rigidity of markups and real
wage.3 Following Blanchard and Kiyotaky (1987), the optimal price and the
optimal wage at time t are given by:
p
∗
t = awt +( 1− a)mt, (1)
w
∗
t = bpt +( 1− b)mt. (2)
The output depends on the level of real balances:
yt = mt − pt. (3)
We introduce some nominal rigidities in the economy: prices set by one
cohort of ﬁrms and wages set by one cohort of workers are not modiﬁed each
period. The duration of each contract is known by advance and follows the
adjustment rule of Taylor (1980): for a contract xt (xt = pt,w t) modiﬁed
in period t,w i t had u r a t i o no fN periods, the probability of changing the
contract is equal to 0 during the N − 1 subsequent periods, and equal to 1
2All variables are expressed in logarithm and are measured as deviations from their
trend values normalized to zero. The steady state is deﬁned as w = p = m and y =0 .
3These elasticities depend on some structural parameters. Following Blanchard (1986),
we have a =1 /α and b =1− α(β − 1),w h e r eα ≥ 1 i st h ei n v e r s eo ft h ed e g r e eo f
returns-to-scale, and β>1 the marginal desutility of work. To ensure b>0,w ea s s u m e
β<1+( 1 /α).













where Et stands for the mathematical expectation of future variables, given
the set of available information at time t (this set of information contains the
path of monetary policy announced at time t). The contract is then set as









Based on the empirical ﬁndings developed in the introduction, we assume
a one-year duration of wage with wage changes mostly concentrated during
the same period. Prices are assumed to be updated every two quarters leading
a duration of one semester. It turns out that at time t, the wage cohort sets
its nominal wage for four periods, from t to t +4 , while at time t +1the
p r i c ec o h o r ts e t si t sp r i c ef o rt w op e r i o d st +1and t +2and again at time
t +3for two periods t +3and t +4 . Three diﬀerent price contracts overlap
with a wage contract. The ﬁrst period of the wage contract coexists with the
price contract set at time t − 1, the second and third periods overlap with
the price set at time t +1and the last period overlaps with the price set at
time t +3 .W ed e n o t eb yp1 and p3 the prices set at the ﬁrst and the third
periods of the wage contract life. The timing of adjustment is summarized
by the following Table:4






wage w0 −→ −→ −→ w4 −→ −→ −→ w8 ...
Table 1: The timing of adjustment
Given Eqs (1), (2) and (5), wages and prices are set according the follow-
4A more complex setup with two cohorts of price and one cohort of wage is discussed
in section 3.2.










































[awt +( 1− a)mt+1]+
1
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[awt +( 1− a)mt+3]+
1
2
Et+3 [awt+4 +( 1− a)mt+4]. (8)
The choice of an asymmetric structure has some implications on the weights
of other contracts taken into account by price setters. As shown in Table
1 ,t h ec h o i c eo fp1 is made only with respect to the past value of wages
( b e c a u s et h ep r i c ec o n t r a c tw i l lb er e n e w e db e f o r et h ew a g ec o n t r a c t ) ,w h i l e
the determination of p3 depends also on the future value of wages (because
the contract will interact both with the current and following wage contracts).
Eqs (6), (7) and (8) permit to obtain the following dynamic equation for
t h ew a g el e v e l( ∀t =0 ,4,8...):
wt = fwt−4 + fEt−1wt + fEtwt+4 + g1mt−1 + g1Et−1mt
+g2mt +( 2 g1 + g2)Etmt+1 +( 2 g1 + g2)Etmt+2












Eq (9) states that the dynamic of wt under rational expectations depends
on both past and future expected values of wt through the terms Et−1wt
and Etwt+4, as well as expected values of mt. Solving the model requires
the elimination of the expected values of wt by the method of lag operators
(Romer, 2006). As in Blanchard (1986), we distinguish the initial impact of
the shock from the subsequent dynamics. We obtain an equation which only
depends on the past values of wages (the initial value of wages is known),
and the expectations about the money path (which depends on the exogenous
and publicly announced monetary policy). The dynamic of wt is then given
by (∀t =0 ,4,8...):








g2mt+4i +( 2 g1 + g2)(mt+1+4i + mt+2+4i)








iEt−1 (mt−1+4i + mt+4i), (10)
5where λ is the stable eigenvalue:
λ =
√








To analyze the impact of a shock on the growth rate of the money, we have
to determine both the growth path of the wage and the initial response (see
Appendix). We denote by ∆wt = wt − wt−4 the growth rate of wage (∀t =
0,4,8..),a n d∆mt = mt−mt−1 the growth rate of money (∀t =0 ,1,2..).W e
have:
f (1 − λ)λ
−1∆wt = f (1 − λ)∆wt−4 − g1Et−5 (M1) − Et−4 (M2)
+g1Et−1 (M3)+Et (M4) (12)
where




i (∆mt−4+4i + ∆mt−5+4i),
M2 =( 2 g1 + g2)
3 X
i=2













g2∆mt−4+4i +( 2 g1 + g2)(∆mt−3+4i + ∆mt−2+4i)







































g2∆mt+4i +( 2 g1 + g2)(∆mt+1+4i + ∆mt+2+4i)
+(g1 + g2)∆mt+3+4i + g1∆mt+4+4i
¸
,
The terms M1−M4 contain the current and past values of money growth, as
well as many past expected terms on money growth. Eq (12) shows that the
wage dynamic is driven by current and past expectations of the growth of the
money stock, with diﬀerent weights for each date of expectation (reﬂecting
the position in the cycle of adjustment presented in Table 1). Let us remark
that the lags of the expectation terms depends on the longer contract and go
up to t − 4 and t − 5.
6The initial impact of a change in the growth rate of money is given by:
(1 − f)∆wt = f (−Et−5∆wt−4 +2 ∆wt−4 − Et−4∆wt + Et−1∆wt + Et∆wt+4)
−g1Et−5∆mt−4 − Et−4 [(2g1 + g2)(2∆mt−1 +2 ∆mt−2 +3 ∆mt−3)]
+2g1∆mt−4 +4( 2 g1 + g2)[∆mt−1 + ∆mt−2 + ∆mt−3]+g1Et−1∆mt
+2(3g1 + g2)∆mt +( 2 g1 + g2)Et [∆mt+3 +2 ∆mt+2 +3 ∆mt+1]
+g1Et∆mt+4. (13)































[−Et+1∆mt+2 +2 ∆mt+2 +2 ∆mt+3 + Et+3∆mt+4].
The inﬂation rate in Eq (14) contains past expectations of the current
wage growth, while Eq (15) contains contemporary expectations of future
wage growth. This feature is important when considering the impact of
monetary shocks.
3 The impact of a disinﬂation policy
Many papers focuse on disinﬂation because it is often associated with high
real costs that are diﬃcult to reproduce in standard models (Ball, 1994a,
Mankiw and Reis, 2002). The estimated costs of disinﬂation policies are also
quite heterogenous (Ball, 1994b). Explanations for the empirical variations
of these costs often rely on the speed of disinﬂation, some labor market
features (Ball, 1994b) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995,I r e l a n d ,1995).
To illustrate the properties of our model, we consider a credible disinﬂation
policy5 occurring at time s.F o r t<s , we set ∆mt = µ and for t ≥ s,
∆mt = µ0,w i t hµ>µ 0. Since the shock is unique, permanent and totally
unexpected, we have Et∆mt+i = ∆mt. In our numerical application, we pass
from an inﬂation rate of µ =1 %to a long term objective of price stability
5The derivation of the general price dynamics allows us to study other types of monetary
shocks, since it just modiﬁes the value of expectations on money growth.
7µ0 =0 . The output cost obtained after the implementation of the disinﬂation
policy is measured by the sacriﬁce ratio. This is deﬁned as the output loss
for one percent of inﬂation reduction. Before the shock, we assume that, at
the regular state, prices and wage are set as an average of the expected levels
of money during the contract life, such that xt =( 1 /N)
Pn
i=0 Etmt+i for
xt = pt, wt. This implies that on average the output y equals its equilibrium
value set to zero. The long run equilibrium values of wages and prices are
equal to the value of the money stock.
3.1 Dynamics
The monetary shock can occur during each of the diﬀerent phases of the
price/wage cycle of adjustment. A shock in t =0coincides with a date of
wage adjustment, while shocks in t =1and t =3coincide with periods of
price revision. In t =2 , neither wages nor prices are adjusted. We show
that, depending on the date of the shock, the disinﬂation can be associated
either to an output loss or to an output boom.6



















Figure (1) displays the response of prices and wages when the disinﬂation
policy occurs at time 0. At this time, the money growth is stopped (µ0 =0 ),
implying a value of the money stock equal to its past value m0 = m−1 =
6The dynamics of both the price and wage inﬂation and the initial responses are dis-
played in Appendix.
8−µ. Since the shock was not expected, the price p3
−1 set before the shock
is based on the previous growth of the money stock (equal to µ)i m p l y i n g
p3
−1 =( 1 /2)(m−1 + m0)=−(1/2)µ. When the disinﬂation occurs, the stop
of the money growth yields a reduction of the real balances (p0 >m 0)a n d
a recession (y0 = m0 − p0 < 0). To explain the slow convergence of the
variables to their long run equilibrium values and the associated persistent
output cost, note that the wage cohort sets optimally in t =0its wage using
E q( 2 )a saw e i g h t e da v e r a g eb e t w e e nt h ep r i c el e v e la n dt h ev a l u eo ft h e
money stock (the weight depends on the parameter b). It turns out that the
wage level also overshoots the money stock. The same kind of adjustment
holds for prices p1
1 and p3
3 according to the rule (1). Since the price level
always overshoots the money stock, the disinﬂation policy is associated to
output costs.
The same mechanisms are at stake when the disinﬂation policy is imple-
mented in time 1 (Figure 2) and in time 2 (Figure 3). The main diﬀerences
concern the magnitude of the nominal variables adjustment.















When the shock occurs in t =1 , wages have been set in t =0with respect





so we obtain w0 =( 1 /4)(0 + µ +2 µ +3 µ)=( 3 /2)µ.T h i s w a g e l e v e l r e -
mains unchanged until period 4. The price p1
1 is updated at the date of the
shock with respect to the new value of the money stock (m1 = m0 =0 )b u t
also on the basis of the past value of the wage w0.S i n c ew a g e sa r et o oh i g h
for the new monetary path, and because of the interactions between prices














and wages, the price level continues to rise in order to catch the value of
wages. It occurs despite of the stability of the money stock (which should
optimally imply a stability of prices). In period t =3 , prices are revised for
t h es e c o n dt i m ea f t e rt h ei m p l e m e n t a t i o no ft h ed i s i n ﬂation. p3
3 is set rela-
tively to the future value of wages according to Eq (15). Hence, expecting
an adjustment of wages in the following period, prices begin to fall and con-
verge towards their long-run value. Since prices are higher than the money
stock during all the process, there is a persistent recession in the economy. A
similar mechanism is at work for recessions occurring when the disinﬂation
shock is in t =2 .A tt h i st i m ew eh a v em2 = m1 = µ, w0 = p1
1 =( 3 /2)µ.
F i g u r e4p r e s e n t sp r i c e sa n dw a g e sd y n a m i c sf o rad i s i n ﬂation imple-
mented in period t =3at the last period of life of the wage contract. As
indicated previously, before the shock, wages are set equal to the mean of the
money stock expected to hold during the whole contract life (Eq 5). Then,
wages at time t =0are ﬁxed expecting a continuous growth of money at
rate µ such that w0 =( 3 /2)µ. When the disinﬂation occurs in period 3, the
money stock is given by m3 = m2 =2 µ. It turns out that the money stock is
higher than the wage level in period 3. Since prices are deﬁned as a weighted
average of the wage level and the money stock, it also implies that in period
3, they are set at a value located between these two variables (see Eq 1). The
price level is then set below the money stock yielding an initial output boom.
Subsequent adjustments of wages and prices are gradual to their equilibrium
values but they remain below the money stock yielding a persistent output
boom. Remark that this output boom does not depend on particular values
















of a and b; these two parameters only aﬀect the magnitude of the boom.7
In Figure 5, we present the comparative response of output for each sce-
nario, for values a = b =0 .99.
7In absolute value, the size of the boom and the recessions decreases if a or b decreases,
but even for very small values of a and b, the qualitative features presented remain valid.
Decreases in a imply more important reductions in the sacriﬁce ratio measured in absolute
value.
11Table 2 shows the robustness of our qualitative results. We display the
sacriﬁce ratios for several values8 of a and b with respect to the dates of
the disinﬂation policy. In absolute value, the size of the boom and the re-
cessions decreases if a or b decreases, but even for lower values of a and b,
our qualitative results remain valid. The highest sacriﬁce ratio occurs for a
shock in t =1when prices are revised. Interestingly, it means that a date
of price adjustment can imply a higher sacriﬁce ratio than a date which is
not associated to any adjustment of nominal variables (this is the case for a
shock occurring in t =2 ). This result may seem to be paradoxical. However
it comes from the asymmetric structure which implies that prices set dur-
ing the ﬁrst period are backward-looking with respect to the wages. Hence,
prices continue to rise despite the stability of the money stock, increasing
the output cost of the disinﬂation. The adjustment of prices indeed rises the
initial output cost, and convergence towards the new path of money only
begins in period 3. Then, for a shock in period 2, there is no initial rise of
price. It results into a lower real cost.
8These elasticities depend on the structural parameters α =1 /a and β =1−a(b−1) of
the model (see footnote 3). We consider two values for α (1.01 and 1.42) and four values
for β (1.007, 1.009, 1.105 and 1.297).
12a b shock in 0 shock in 1 shock in 2 shock in 3
0.99 0.99 4.8 16.47 4.95 −4.4
0.7 0.99 1.11 4.1 1.17 −0.67
0.7 0.85 0.9 3.8 1.07 −0.57
0.99 0.7 1.12 5.82 1.44 −0.94
Table 2: Sacriﬁce ratios (in %)
3.2 Discussion about the price-wage structure
Our asymmetric temporal structure is highly stylized. In a more realistic
framework, at least a fraction of prices should be modiﬁed each quarter,
implying changes in the aggregate price index every quarter and not only in
quarters 1 and 3 as in the previous structure. It does not alter the possibility
of an output boom. Nevertheless, the boom will not be systematic as in our
model. One can imagine a standard staggered prices structure àl aTaylor
(with two cohorts of equal size, setting 2 periods contracts, as in Romer,
2006), combined with an annual wage modiﬁcation (which still represents
the U.S. case or the Japanese Shunto). Denoting the prices set by the ﬁrst
cohort of ﬁrms by pi and the prices set by the second cohort of ﬁrms by
pj, the general price level is given by p =( 1 /2)(pi + pj). In this case, the





(pi + pj)+( 1− a1)m
p
∗
i = b1w + b2pj +( 1− b1 − b2)m
p
∗
j = b1w + b2pi +( 1− b1 − b2)m











Assume that cohort i changes its price at even periods for two periods,
cohort j at odd periods for two periods, and the wage cohort at even periods
for four periods. Based on the timing procedure presented in section 2, we can
derive a more complicated dynamic structure which is much less tractable.
However, an output boom is still possible. However our result will depend on
two contradictory eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect relies on the interactions between
price setters in the staggered structure of Taylor. This generates output
costs of disinﬂation (Musy, 2006). The second eﬀe c ti sd u et ot h ed u r a t i o no f
w a g ec o n t r a c t s .I tc a ng e n e r a t ea no u t p u tg a i nw h e nt h ed i s i n ﬂation occurs
just before its updating. When the two eﬀects are active, the net impact
depends on the relative weights of the parameters in the previous equations.
Mechanisms are the same than those presented, excepted that, in addition,
price setters have to take into account the prices set by their competitors. If
13t h ew e i g h tr e l a t i v et oc o m p e t i t o r si sn o tr e l a t i v e l yh i g h ,t h eo u t p u tb o o mi s
still present.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Most current models of output and inﬂation dynamics, despite their size and
complexity, are built on very simple uniform staggering structures. They pre-
dict no relationship between the impact of a monetary shock and its date of
occurrence. Olivei and Tenreyro (2007, 2008) challenge this prediction, giving
some evidence that shocks have asymmetric eﬀects depending on their date
of occurrence during the process of wage adjustment. This paper presents an
original price and wage structure based on Blanchard (1986), assuming that
wages have a longer duration than prices. We show that the strategic in-
teractions between staggered price and wage give a combination of multiple
expectations terms that diﬀer for each period of the cycle of wage adjust-
ments. Indeed, the date of the shock appears to be important because each
date corresponds to a particular combination of price and wage expectations;
and each combination determines a speciﬁc initial impact of the shock. Then
this initial response is transmitted to the following periods due to the over-
lapping structure of the contracts. In our example, a disinﬂation causes a
boom when the shock occurs during the last quarter of wage rigidity and re-
cessions of diﬀerent magnitudes occur during the other quarters. The highest
sacriﬁce ratio occurs during a period of price change. It challenges the idea
that the sacriﬁce ratio would always be lower when the nominal rigidity is
also the lower (as it is the case in simple models building on Calvo, 1983).
One reader could object that our results are model speciﬁc. Indeed, the
quantitative results obtained are model dependent, and are merely an illus-
tration of the unexpected results that can be obtained when we combine
price and wage rigidities using ﬁnite length contracts àl aTaylor. However,
the mechanisms presented rest only on the expected terms inherent to the
structure of Taylor. Similar results could be obtained with alternative struc-
tures based on contracts à la Taylor. The Calvo structure is more used in
t h el i t e r a t u r eb u ti t sv e r ys p e c i ﬁc nature erases all the expectations terms in
the dynamics. This gives more tractable models but at the expense of less
i n t e r e s t i n gd y n a m i c sa sw eh a v es h o w ni nt h i sp a p e r .
14APPENDIX: Disinﬂation dynamics with asymmetric contracts
We present the general dynamics of the price and wage inﬂation for a
speciﬁc money supply process and the initial responses of the monetary shock.
Wage and price inﬂation dynamics
Eq (12) can be rewritten as for all t =0 ,4,8...:
∆wt = λ∆wt−4 +
λ
f (1 − λ)
2
µ
−h5∆mt−5 − h4∆mt−4 + h3∆mt−3
+h3∆mt−2 + h2∆mt−1 + h1∆mt
¶
with
h1 =( 1 9 − 13λ)g1 +2( 5− 3λ)g2; h2 =( 9− 7λ)g1 +4 ( 1− λ)g2
h3 =4 ( 1 + λ)(2g1 + g2); h4 =( 1 1− 7λ)g1 +3( 2− λ)g2
h5 =( 1 + λ)g1
Price dynamics are derived from eqs (14) and (15).
Initial Impact
The initial responses are given by eq (13). They depend on the date of
the shock.
Shock at time 0
When the monetary policy is implemented at time 0 during a period of




[1 − f (1 + λ)](4f +1 3 g1 +6 g2)





[1 − f (1 + λ)](19g1 +1 0 g2)




z∆w4 =[ 2 f [4f +1 3 g1 +6 g2] − (4f + g1)(1− f)]µ
+
∙
(1 − f)[4f(1 − λ)+3 3 g1 +1 6 g2]




∆wt = λ∆wt−4 +4( 1− λ)µ
0 for t =8 ,12,...

























∆wt+1 +2( 1− a)µ
0 for t =3 ,7,11...
Shock at time 1









4f(1 − λ)+2 2( 2 g1 + g2)




∆wt = λ∆wt−4 +4( 1− λ)µ
0 for t =8 ,12




















∆wt+1 +2( 1− a)µ
0 for t =3 ,7,11...
Shock at time 2









4f(1 − λ)+1 8( 2 g1 + g2)




∆wt = λ∆wt−4 +4( 1− λ)µ
0 for for t =8 ,12

























∆wt+1 +2( 1− a)µ
0 for t =3 ,7,11...
Shock at time 3









4f(1 − λ)+1 4( 2 g1 + g2)




∆wt = λ∆wt−4 +4( 1− λ)µ
0 for t =8 ,12

























∆wt+1 +2( 1− a)µ
0 for t =7 ,11,..
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